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granting of services is less likely to be detected than the granting of price
differentials. 9
In addition, the furnishing of services may in some circumstances be more
appropriate than a price differential to pass on cost savings to a buyer. The
furnishing of a "demonstrator" to the buyer,"0 for example, would result
in a benefit to the seller"' while at the same time providing a means of returning
to the buyer the amount justified by cost savings. In any event, advertence
to the fact of cost savings at the time a differential is granted does not appear
to be a requirement for cost justification under Section 2(a).62 Thus prohibition
of cost-justified, though disproportional, differentials in services or payments
for services would disadvantage the seller with actual cost savings, and would
therefore result in "disparity in the statutory consequences which attach
to economically equivalent business practices."63
59Although a payment for services, dealt with in Section 2(d), might be hidden from the
public, no reason appears why the granting of a price differential could be more easily dis-

covered.
11A "demonstrator" is a salesman whose services are furnished by the seller to the buyer.
The "demonstrator" will perform the normal salesman's duties at the buyer's place of business,
but will also take every opportunity to call the attention of the buyer's customers to the seller's
product. See Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (C.A.8th, 1945), cert. denied
326 U.S. 773 (1945). Thus, of two equal expenditures, that for providing services to the
buyer may be of more benefit to the seller than would the granting of a price differential
to the buyer.
61See discussion in the preceding note.
62
Although the furnishing of services has been said not to be on "proportionally equal"
terms unless furnished according to a standard or program set up at the time the services
were granted [see Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (C.A.8th, 1945)], no
similar holding with respect to cost justification has been found.
3Attorney General's Report 191 (1955).

ACCORDING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO FOREIGN
MODIFIABLE ALIMhONY DECREES
Limited recognition and enforcement of foreign modifiable alimony decrees
often result in serious prejudice to a wife's (W)' right to installment payments
where the husband (H) has left the jurisdiction rendering the decree.2 Because
the Full Faith and Credit Clause' has been held to compel recognition only in
' For ease of reference, husband and wife will be designated by the symbols H and W respectively. The state awarding the alimony decree will be designated as F-1; the state in which
enforcement of the decree is sought will be designated as F-2. "Foreign," as used in this Comment refers to sister states rather than foreign countries, and "alimony" includes support and
separate maintainance.
2 See Jacobs, The Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob.
250 (1939).
3U.S. Const. Art. 4, §1.
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the case of non-modifiable accrued installments, 4 modifiable arrearages and fu5
ture installments have usually been denied recognition. But in Light v. Light,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that a Missouri alimony decree was entitled to
full faith and credit with respect both to unpaid accrued installments and to
modifiable future installments. 6 This result may have far-reaching implications
with respect to recognition and enforcement of accrued installments, recognition
and enforcement of future installments, and foreign modification-the three
problems which have frequently plagued the courts when dealing with foreign
7
alimony decrees.
The problem of recognition of accrued installments under a foreign decree
first came before the Supreme Court of the United States in Barber v. Barber.8
In allowing recovery of unpaid arrearages the Court seemed to be of the view
that full faith and credit must be given to accrued installments of foreign alimony decrees on a broad basis. 9 But in Lynde v. Lynde'0 this broad view was
sharply curtailed. The Court held that full faith and credit did not compel recognition of retrospectively modifiable accruals which had not been reduced to a
final judgment for a fixed sum. As no mention of the Barbercase was made in the
4 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909).
6 12 Ill.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958).
6 W sought registration of the Missouri decree under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, which applies only to such judgments and decrees as are entitled to full faith
and credit. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 77, §88(a). The circuit court had entered a decree directing
that the Missouri decree be registered as to accrued installments. H appealed the registration,
and W cross-appealed due to the court's failure to register the future installments.
Due to the availability of the registration procedure, the effect of the Light case may be
strongest in the other states which have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp., 1957) §§29-801 to 29-818; 32 Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon,
1952) §511.760; 2 Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1956) §§25-1587 to 25-15,104; 1 Ore. Rev. Stat.
(1957) §§24.010-24.180; 1 Rev. Code of Wash. (1956) c. 6.36; 33 Wis. Stat. Ann. (1958)
§270.96; 1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. (Supp., 1957) c. 3 Art. 80.
8 21 How. (U.S.) 582 (1858). In an equity proceeding in the United States District Court for
Wisconsin, W sought to compel payment of accrued installments under a New York alimony
decree. The relief was granted, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that diversity jurisdiction was proper as W had a separate domicile from H due to the divorce a mensa et thoro.
9"The decree.., is a judgment of record, and will be received as such by other courts.
And such a judgment or decree, rendered in any State in the United States, the court having
jurisdiction, will be carried into judgment in any other State, to have there the same binding
force that it has in the State in which it was originally given." Id., at 591.
10181 U.S. 183 (1901). The action was brought in New York to enforce a New Jersey decree.
W sought to compel payment of decreed accruals, and of installments accrued subsequent to
the decree. She also requested equitable enforcement of prospective installments. The Special
Term decreed full recovery and prospective enforcement, but the Appellate Division held that
W was entitled only to an action at law for the decreed accruals. 41 App. Div. 280, 58 N.Y.
Supp. 567 (1899), aff'd 162 N.Y. 405, 56 N.E. 979 (1900). The Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground that full faith and credit did not compel recognition or enforcement.
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lynde opinion, it was not apparent whether the latter overruled, qualified, or
merely stood in conflict with the former.
This situation was clarified by the Supreme Court in Sistare v. Sistare.n Mr.
Justice White stated the test for full faith and credit:
[Wihere a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in future installments
the right to such installments becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due, and is
therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the
decree has been made prior to the maturity of the installments.2 ... This general rule,
however, does not obtain where by the law of the State in which the judgment for
future alimony is rendered the right to demand and receive such future alimony is
discretionary with the court which rendered the decree...

3

The Court held that the New York decree in question was not retrospectively
modifiable,'1 4 and, thus, the Connecticut court was compelled to recognize accruals under it.
The Sistare case stands for the proposition that full faith and credit requires
F-2 to recognize installments accrued under an F-1 decree unless the accruals
are subject to retrospective modification in F-1.15 This proposition rests on the
assumption that finality is requisite to full faith and credit. 16 The practical result
of the finality requirement is that W may find herself unable to enforce a retrospectively modifiable decree, if H has left the jurisdiction and has no assets
1 218 U.S. 1 (1909). W brought an action in Connecticut to recover accrued installments
under a New York decree. Relying on the Lynde case, the Connecticut court denied recognition
upon a finding that the arrearages were subject to the discretion of the New York court.
Sistare v. Sistare, 80 Conn. 1, 66 Atl. 772 (1907).

"2This language has been interpreted to mean that even "vested" accruals are not entitled
to full faith and credit where there has been a prior prospective modification by the F-1 court.
,See Paulin v. Paulin, 195 Ill. App. 350 (1915); 2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws 1393 (1935). The
merits of such an interpretation appear questionable. Assuming that finality is requisite to full
faith and credit, it is difficult to understand how a prior prospective modification could affect
the finality of the accrued installments at the time of the F-2 proceeding if the installments
were not susceptible to retrospective modification.
"3Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1909).
14This conclusion was supported by the restrictive test of retrospective modification propounded by the Court: "[E]very reasonable implication must be resorted to against the existence of such power [of retrospective modification] in the absence of clear language manifesting an intention to confer it." Id., at 22.
15Where the foreign decree is retrospectively modifiable most courts have refused all recognition, claiming the Sistare case as authority for this position. See cases collected in Decree for
Alimony in Installments as within Full Faith and Credit Provisions, 157 A.L.R. 170 (1945).
16 This assumption is open to serious question. "Neither the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution nor the Act of Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments or,
for that matter, about any judgments. Both require that full faith and credit be given to
'judicial proceedings' without limitation as to finality." Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in
Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944). Similarly, see Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in
part, in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 247 (1946), and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's and Mr.
Justice Rutledge's concurring opinions in Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 616-17, 620-21
(1947).
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which can be attached in F-1. The undesirability of this result has led a few
7
courts to recognize retrospectively modifiable decrees on grounds of comity.'
Agreeing that they are not required to recognize such decrees under the Sistare
rule, these courts have proceeded to state that the rule does not prevent recognition. Such comity recognition appears highly desirable, but since it rests with
the discretion of the courts of each state, it does not appear to be a dependable
solution to the recognition problem.
It is against this background that the Light case must be viewed. Justice
Schaeffer, speaking for the Illinois court, recognized the Sistare rule and stated
that the accrued installments were not entitled to full faith and credit if retrospectively modifiable in Missouri. The defendant contended that this limitation
applied as Missouri would retrospectively modify the decree to conform to an
agreement between the parties.18 The court did not deny this contention, but
held instead that the arrearages were entitled to full faith and credit on the
grounds that the lower court found no agreement and the defendant failed to
properly appeal this finding.
Even had such an agreement been proven, it is doubtful that this would have
been sufficient to deny full faith and credit under the rule of the Sistare case
since the limitation set forth there applies in cases in which "the right to demand
and receive such future alimony is discretionary with the court which rendered
the decree.... ."' It appears that the Supreme Court was only concerned with
such modifications as were within the power of the original court, and such
retrospective modification as depends on an out-of-court agreement of the
parties falls outside the bar of the Sistare decision, since the amount would not
be subject to the discretion of the court. 0
Since Missouri courts do not have the power to retrospestively modify their
decrees,21 it would seem that the Light case is consistent, so far, with the Sistare
rule. On the other hand, it might well be contended that the reasons of sound
17 Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); Sorenson v. Spence, 65 S.D.
134, 272 N.W. 179 (1937); Bolton v. Bolton, 86 N.J.L. 69, 89 At. 1014 (S.Ct., 1914), aff'd on
other grounds 86 N.J.L. 622, 92 At. 389 (1914), the Court of Errors and Appeals holding that
the accruals were entitled to full faith and credit as they were not retrospectively modifiable.
See Gough v. Gough, 101 Cal.App.2d 262, 255 P.2d 668 (1951). Cf. Holton v. Holton, 153
Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922). Retrospectively modifiable arrearages were held entitled to
full faith and credit where there had not been a previous retrospective modification.
IsMaxey v. Maxey, 212 S.W.2d 810 (Mo.App., 1948); Meyers v. Meyers, 22 S.W.2d 853

(Mo.App., 1929).
19Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 17 (1909). Similarly, the test of retrospective modifiability
established on the Sistare case is phrased in terms of the "power" of the court. See note 14
supra.
20This distinction was made in Shilbey v. Shilbey, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P.2d 446 (1935). If
an agreement to modify meets the requirements of an enforceable contract, retrospective
modification would appear permissible irrespective of the accruals being "vested." But see
Mosher v. Mosher, 25 Wash.2d 778, 172 P.2d 259 (1946), which suggests a different result in
the case of support decrees as the rights of the children are involved.
21Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (1920).
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public policy and of constitutional interpretation which led the Illinois court to
hold that modifiable future installments are entitled to full faith and credit are
equally applicable to modifiable arrearages. Viewed in this light, the Illinois
decision constitutes a step away from the strict Sislare prohibition and towards
mandatory recognition of retrospectively modifiable decrees.
Recognition, whether by full faith and credit or by comity, of W's substantive
right to accrued installments may be worth little if she is limited to an action of
debt, the classic means of enforcing a foreign money judgment.
Passages in both the early Barberopinion 2 and the Lynde opinion 3 have been
construed to mean that full faith and credit does not purport to describe enforcement proceedings so that there is no compulsion on a state to make available to
a foreign alimony decree the same enforcement proceedings accorded to a domestic decree.2 4 Thus, the beneficial equitable remedies of contempt, bond
sequestration, and receivership may be unavailable to W unless F-2 provides
them by statute25 A growing number of states, however, have allowed equitable
enforcement on grounds of comity. 25 This has usually been coupled with prospective recognition and enforcement of future installments so that the foreign decree is treated as if it were a domestic one.

II
Recognition of future installments is closely associated with the problem of
equitable enforcement. If W's only remedy in F-2 is an action at law, she must
21 "Alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce of separation from bed and board is as much a
debt of record, until the decree has been recalled, as any other judgment for money is." 21 How.
(U.S.) 582, 595 (1859).
The phrase "debt of record" was adopted to signify that the equity decree was a judgment
capable of supporting an action of debt. Instead it has been interpreted to mean that alimony
constitutes such a debt, and that an action at law is an adequate remedy against the defaultin
husband. See Jacobs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 270. Compare Lawrence v. Lawrence, 196 Ga. 204,
26 S.E.2d 283 (1943), with Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934).
23 "The provisions [of the foreign decree] for bond, sequestration, receiver and injunction
being in the nature of execution, and not of judgment, could have no extra-territorial operation;
but the action of the courts of New York in these respects depended on the local statutes and
practices in the state.. . ." 181 U.S. 183, 187 (1901). Cf. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. (U.S.)
312 (1839).
2
4Equitable enforcement has generally been denied on one of three grounds: (1) that it is
not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, e.g., Scholla v. Scholla, 201 F.2d 211 (App.
D.C., 1953), cert. denied 345 U.S. 966 (1953); (2) that W has an adequate remedy at law, e.g.,
Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118,174 N.E. 206 (1931); and (3) that equitable enforcement
of alimony decrees is solely statutory, and the local statute applies only to domestic decrees,
e.g., Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N.W. 890 (1908); Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85,
75 N.E. 92 (1905).
25 See 6A Mass. Ann. L. (1955) c. 208, §35; 2A N.J. Stat. Ann. (1952) §34-23; 6A N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, 1944) §§1171-72.
26E.g., Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal.App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929); McDuffie v.
McDuffie, 155 Fla. 63, 19 So.2d 511 (1944); McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308, 123 A.2d 447
(1956); Fanchier v. Gammili, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927); Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155
Ore. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936). For the Illinois situation prior to the Light decision see note 29
infra.
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wait until the installments have accrued. Such a procedure, however, seriously
weakens the efficacy of the decree. If W must bring successive actions at law,
litigation expenses may severely curtail the value of her F-2 judgment. She may
have to wait until sufficient installments have accrued in order to make litigation economically feasible.2 7 This seems to be antithetical to the idea of alimony
installments providing W with a continuing maintainance. Equitable relief with
respect to accrued installments only, though increasing the probability that W
will be able to achieve satisfaction, does not solve the problem as she will still be
required to bring successive suits. The answer appears to lie in the recognition
and enforcement of future payments by "establishing" the F-1 decree as the
decree of the F-2 tribunal and enforcing it by the same sanctions available to one
obtaining a domestic decree.
States which have claimed strict adherence to the Sistare doctrine have generally refused prospective recognition2 8 But an increasing number have allowed
prospective recognition and enforcement on grounds of comity.29 These decisions
have recognized that the obligation to pay alimony is materially different from
the ordinary money judgment,3" and that the enforcement procedure for foreign
money judgments is inadequate in the case of alimony decrees. They recognize
27 See Scholla v. Scholla, 201 F.2d 211, 214 (App.D.C., 1953) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied 345 U.S. 966 (1953); Jacobs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 265-66.
25 Where equitable relief has been held unavailable for enforcement of accrued installments,
it has also been denied for prospective installments. See note 24 supra. However, the contention
that W's remedy at law is adequate, at best questionable in the case of accruals, seems untenable where future payments are involved.
In German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 Ati. 429 (1936), the anomalous result of granting
equitable enforcement to overdue payments, while denying it to prospective installments, was
reached. This appears to be the lone case in which the two situations were not treated similarly.
The Connecticut court relied for this result on its prior determination in the Sistare case where
it dealt only with accrued installments. Sistare v. Sistare, 80 Conn. 1, 66 Atl. 772 (1907), rev'd
218 U.S. 1 (1909).
29 The leading case is Fanchier v. Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927). Accord:
Cummingsv. Cummings, 97 Cal.App. 144,275 Pac. 245 (1929); Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292
(Fla., 1950); McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308, 123 A.2d 447 (1956); Ostrander v. Ostrander,
190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934); Johnson v. Johnson, 194 S.C. 115, 8 S.E.2d 351 (1940);
Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936); Sorenson v. Spence, 65 S.D. 134,
272 N.W. 179 (1937); Guerica v. Guerica, 239 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App., 1951); Mckeel
v. Mckeel, 185 Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d 746 (1946); Shilbey v. Shilbey, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P.2d
446 (1935).
Prior to the Light decision the availability of equitable enforcement of foreign alimony
decrees was doubtful in Illinois. In Rule v. Rule, 313 Ill.App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379 (1942),
equitable enforcement was upheld. But in Tailby v. Tailby, 342 Ill.App. 664, 97 N.E.2d 611
(1951), it was denied, the court relying on Clubb v. Clubb, 402 Ill. 390, 84 N.E.2d 366 (1949),
where equitable enforcement was denied to the decree of a foreign country. The Tailby case
appears to have been overruled, however, in Roberts v. Roberts, 11 Ill.App.2d 86, 136 N.E.2d
590 (1956), where the court returned to the Rule case. But prior to the Light decision, the
Clubb case constituted the only statement by the Illinois Supreme Court on the availability of
equitable enforcement.
30 In other situations this difference has been legislatively or judicially noticed. A discharge
in bankruptcy does not release H from his alimony obligation. 52 Stat. 851 (1938); 11 U.S.C.A.
§35(2) (1953); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901). Generally, alimony decrees may be
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also that H's obligation should not be extinguished or materially diminished
solely by reason of his having left F-1. Though achieving the desired practical
result of prospective recognition and enforcement, comity, since at the discretion of each state, fails to afford a dependable remedy for W.
The Light case offers a solution. Stating that although there were "indications" in the leading cases that prospectively modifiable alimony decrees were
not entitled to full faith and credit there were also "intimations" to the contrary in the same cases, Justice Schaeffer considered the matter to be an
open question. Considerations of policy, the language of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause3 and the practicality of the blueprint for foreign modification
advanced in Worthley v. Worthley 2 led him to conclude that the Missouri decree
was entitled to full faith and credit as to future installments even though subject
to prospective modification. While the result reached appears highly desirable it
would seem that the matter is not so open as the Light decision indicates in view
of the precedent of the Lynde case. 3
With respect to future installments the Lynde case was not qualified by the
Sistare decision, which dealt only with accrued installments. But if both cases
are considered together, the Sistare case may be said to stand, by implication,
for the proposition that modifiable future installments are not entitled to full
faith and credit. The contention underlying both cases appears to be that if a
portion of a decree is subject to modification, that portion is not entitled to full
faith and credit as it lacks the alleged requisite finality. Such a view would seem
to be prompted by a belief that F-1 modification subsequent to F-2 recognition
and enforcement would result in chaos and confusion between the courts of F-i,
F-2 and any third state which might subsequently serve as a forum for the litigation. It would follow that such a result could be avoided only by requiring nonmodifiability or "finality" of the F-1 decree as a prerequisite to foreign enforcement.3 4 If such a belief underlies the Sistare opinion, it would apply not only to
enforced by imprisonment for contempt, a remedy unavailable in the case of an ordinary money
judgment or decree. See Chafee and Re, Cases and Materials on Equity 47 n.37(2) (4th ed.,

19S8).
3 See Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77,87 (1944),
at note 16 supra.
n44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955). See discussion at 143 infra.
" "The provision of the payment of alimony in the future was subject to the discretion of
the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, which might at any time alter it, and was not a final
judgement for a fixed sum." Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1902). See note 10 supra.
4The alternative is to view finality as a technical requirement of full faith and credit. Such
a view is highly questionable, as the contention that finality of amount is necessary to
entitle a judgment to full faith and credit is not apparent from the language of the Constitution. See note 18 supra.
With respect to judgments, full faith and credit requires that a judgment be given the same
conclsive effect in F-2 as it has in F-1. See 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 187 (3d ed., 1858). Cf. Hampton v. M'Connell, 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 234 (1818);
Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 481 (1813). One of the first expressions of the finality require-
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modifiable accruals, but also to modifiable future installments. A practical plan
for foreign modification, however, would allay the fears which may have engendered the finality limitation.
IIl
Recognition and enforcement of modifiable foreign alimony decrees, whether
on grounds of full faith and credit or comity, raise several questions: (1) may
F-2 modify a foreign decree or is the power restricted to the F-1 court; (2) are
the limits of modification to be set by the law of F-1 or F-2; (3) whose law is to
determine the grounds for modification and whether there has been a change in
circumstances sufficient to justify modification; and (4) what will be the effect
of F-2 modification on subsequent litigation on the decree in F-1 or a third
state?
The Light decision suggests that modifiable decrees be treated according to
the plan set forth by the California Supreme Court in Worthley v. Worthley.35
Five propositions make up this plan: (1) in a proceeding to enforce a foreign
modifiable decree, where F-2 has personal jurisdiction over both parties, it not
only may, but it should afford an opportunity for the litigation of the question
of modification; (2) F-1 law is to determine the limits of modification; (3) F-1
law is also to determine the grounds for modification; (4) where F-2 has determined the issue of retrospective modification of accrued installments, the judgment for a liquidated sum is final and entitled to full faith and credit in all other
states; and (5) issues determined with respect to prospective modification will
be res judicata so long as the circumstances of the parties remain unchanged."
Where the F-1 court renders a modifiable decree it retains jurisdiction over
ment acknowledged the difference between "conclusiveness" and "finality" in stating that
"[tlhe provision of the Federal Constitution, which requires that full faith and credit shall be
given to the judicial proceedings of another state, in my opinion, should be deemed to relate to
judgments, or decrees, which not only are conclusive on the jurisdiction where rendered, but
which are final in their nature." Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N.Y. 405, 418, 56 N.E. 979, 983 (1900),
aff'd 181 U.S. 183 (1901).
A modifiable alimony decree, though not final, constitutes a conclusive determination of
H's obligation, provided the circumstances of the parties remain unchanged. Judicial action
can legitimately affect H's obligation, once determined, only where the status quo has been
changed by acts of the parties or other agencies, e.g., tax changes or a major change in the cost
of living; the F-1 decree can not be modified unless such a change has occurred, and, therefore,
may be viewed as conclusive. It has been pointed out that finality-of-judgments requirements
in conflict-of-laws situations are not rules of automatic application but depend instead on the
particular circumstances. The Finality of Judgments in the Conflict of Laws, 41 Col. L. Rev.
878 (1941). Therefore, it may be suggested that "finality" as distinct from "conclusiveness"
has no proper bearing on the recognition of modifiable alimony decrees.
-544 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
36 Though the Worthley case dealt with comity recognition, the modification plan will apply
equally well to a decree recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Thus, under the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, if personal jurisdiction is secured over H
subsequent to W's petition to register the foreign decree, H would be permitted to present such
matters pertaining to modification as would be permitted in F-1.
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the subject matter so as to facilitate subsequent modification. This concept of
"continuing jurisdiction" has resulted in F-2's refusal to modify a foreign decree
on the grounds that such "jurisdiction" is exclusive, and full faith and credit
forbids modification.3 7 Rejected in a few recent decisions, 38 this contention ap-

pears to be without merit. First, accepting the applicability of "continuing jurisdiction" in the foreign enforcement situation, the conclusion that the F-1 jurisdiction is exclusive does not follow from its being "continuous." Second, it may
be contended that "continuing jurisdiction" is not applicable to the foreign
enforcement situation since its function is solely to facilitate domestic modification. 19 Thus, F-2 should not be prevented from modifying an F-1 decree due to
F-l's "retention of jurisdiction."
Though F-2 may modify, the limits of such modification should be determined by F-1 law. A difference between F-1 and F-2 law is likely to occur only
with respect to retrospective modification since prospective modification will
generally be permissible in both states.40 Full faith and credit does not presently
compel F-2 to litigate the issue of modification where F-1 law provides for
modification but F-2 law does not. There appears, however, to be no reason why
F-2 should not so modify. A dominant consideration in denying retrospective
modification to domestic decrees is a desire to bring arrearages under such decrees within the protection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 41 Where F-2 is
37 Barns v. Barns, 9 Cal.App.2d 427, 50 P.2d 463 (1935); Goldberg v. Mayer, 243 App.Div.
477, 277 N.Y.Supp. 799 (1935), aff'd 270 N.Y. 660, 1 N.E.2d 986 (1936); Little v. Little, 146
Misc. 231, 262 N.Y.Supp. 654 (S.Ct., 1932). See Paulin v. Paulin, 195 Ill.App. 350 (1915). Cf.
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (non-modifiable support settlements).

ss Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). Dealing with a modifiable custody decree, the
Court stated that "so far as the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida
could do in modifying the decree, New York may do.... [Ilt is clear that the State of the
forum has at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it
as does the State where it was rendered." Id., at 614-15. For subsequent applications of this
reasoning to alimony decrees see, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 204 Misc. 656, 123 N.Y.S.2d 196
(Dom.Rel.Ct., 1953), aff'd sub nom. Barclay v. Marston, 283 App.Div. 659, 127 N.Y.S.2d 843
(1954); Robison v. Robison, 9 N.J. 288, 88 A.2d 202 (1952); Setzer v. Setzer, 251 Wis. 234,
29 N.W.2d 62 (1947).
The practical effect of modification has also been achieved where notions of "continuing
jurisdiction" in the rendering state have compelled the court of the forum to deny the fact that
it was undertaking modification. Thus, a few courts have spoken in terms of their decree
"superseding" rather than modifying the F-1 decree. Lopez v. Avery, 66 So.2d 689 (Fla., 1953);
Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936). Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 196 S.C. 474,
13 S.E.2d 593 (1941). After stating it could not modify a foreign decree, the court decreased
payments by granting prospective enforcement of only part of the installments decreed by F-1.
"1See Interstate Recognition of Alimony Decrees, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 692, 710 (1953).
402 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment §17.01 (2d ed., 1945). For a discussion of the various
positions respecting retrospective modification see, Retrospective Modification of, or Refusal
to Enforce, Decrees for Alimony, Separate Maintenance or Support, 6 A.L.R.2d 1277 (1949).
41
Though allowed in only a minority of states, retrospective modification may be a desirable socialpolicy. See Nelson, op. cit. supra note 40, at §17.05; RetrospectiveModification of
Alimony Decrees: A Proposed Innovation for Illinois, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 246 (1954). It can
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dealing with a foreign decree, retrospective modification does not conflict with
this policy. Nor is any burden placed on F-2's judicial machinery as the procedure is no more complex for litigating the issue of retrospective modification
than it is in the case of prospective modification which F-2 probably allows for
domestic decrees. Thus, if F-2 enforces a modifiable decree it should permit
modification, retrospective or prospective, upon proof of changed circumstances,
rather than requiring the parties to return to F-i, a highly impractical solution. 42 Conversely, if F-1 decrees are not modifiable, full faith and credit pre43
vents F-2 modification.
Though F-1 law should govern the limits of modification, it does not follow
that it must govern the grounds for modification. Though generally permitted
where changed circumstances have rendered the previously determined payments inequitable, 44 modification policy differs from state to state. Thus F-2
may find itself confronted with a choice of law situation. Where F-i and F-2 law
differ as to whether a particular change in the parties' circumstances constitutes
grounds for modification, there is reflected a difference in policy as to whether
W or H is to be protected in view of the changed situation. Policies protecting
W will result in increased payments at her petition and proof of change or in
denial of reduction or cancellation at H's motion. Conversely, policies protecting
H result in reduction or cancellation of his obligation or in denial of increases.
Foreign recognition and enforcement are usually requested where one party no
longer resides in F-1. Thus, with respect to modification, four interesting situa45
tions are possible:
H's

W's

Case

Residence

F-I Policy

F-2 Policy

Residence

Protects

Protects

1

F-I

F-2

H

2
3
4

F-2
F-1
F-2

F-i
F-2
F-I

H
W
W

W
W
H
I

not be doubted, however, that one effect of the Sistare decision has been to promote a reluctance in state courts and legislatures towards providing retrospective modification of domestic
decrees. See Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 226 S.W. 1066 (1920).
42
But see Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292 (Fla., 1950). The court refused to recognize and
enforce retrospectively modifiable arrearages which had not been reduced to a final judgment
in F-1 on the grounds that Florida did not allow retrospective modification, of domestic decrees.
At the same time the court granted recognition and enforcement to prospectively modifiable
future installments.
43
Cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
44 See Nelson, op. cit. supra note 40, at §17.07-17.20 for a discussion of changed circumstances sufficient for modification.
46The choice of F-i and F-2 as the residences of the parties is used for simplicity. Where one
party resides in a third state rather than F-i, the law of that state should be of concern rather
than the law of F-1. That the original decree was rendered in F-i should not be sufficient to
justify the choice of F-i law where neither party is a resident; and F-i, consequently, has no
interest in the litigation. Where neither state has an interest in the litigation because neither
party is a resident, a dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens may be in order. This accounts for the possibilities other than those considered in the text.
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In each case the determination of the applicable modification law should depend
on the economic and social policies of F-1 and F-2 and on the interests of the
states in having their policies applied to that case. 46In case 1 both F-1 and F-2
have an interest in the application of their policies. F-1 protects husbands, and
as H is a resident his economic well-being is a matter of F-1 concern. Similarly,
F-2 policy protects wives; W is a resident; and, thus, F-2 has an interest. Neither
F-1 nor F-2 has an interest in case 2 as neither party resides in the state which is
primarily concerned with his (her) economic protection with respect to the particular change in circumstances upon which modification is requested. Cases 3
and 4 present the converse situations as here the modification policies are reversed. Thus, in cases 1 and 4 both states have an interest in the issue of
modification; whereas in cases 2 and 3 neither state is interested.
Arguably, F-2 law should apply in both situations. Where both states have
an interest in the outcome of the litigation (cases 1 and 4) a court should forego
the foreign policy in the advancement of the domestic policy.47 Where neither
state has an interest (cases 2 and 3) it may be contended that a court should
apply its own law on grounds of expertise and because there is no reason to apply
the foreign law. 48 And, clearly, where both parties reside in F-2, its modification
policy should prevail as it is the only interested state.
However, the effect of choice of law as to the grounds for modification must
be considered with respect to subsequent litigation in F-1 or a third state which
may become a subsequent forum. If the law of the forum is to determine the
grounds for modification, where one party resides in-the forum and the other in
the state rendering the original decree, the applicable law will vary according to
choice of forum. Due to the modifiability of the decree, litigation may not end
with the F-2 proceeding. If modification policy is determined solely by the choice
of forum, each subsequent forum will be able to modify the decree in accord
with its domestic determination of changed circumstances. 49 Since res judicata
4

6For a discussion of this approach to the problem of conflict of laws, see, Currie, On the
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 Col. L. Rev. 964 (1958); Currie, Survival of Actions:
Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958); Currie,
Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 227
(1958). Compare the suggestions regarding modification in Scoles, Enforcement of Foreign
"Non-Final" Alimony and Support Orders, 53 Col. L. Rev. 817, 823 (1953).
47 "The sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any court to do, confronted with a true
conflict of interests, is to apply its own law." Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 227 (1958).
48 Under this analysis F-1 law would properly be applied only if F-1 had a policy and an
interest and F-2 did not. This situation does not arise in the present context, however. See
148 supra.

41For example, F-2 might decrease the payments upon its determination of changed circumstances in accord with its own law. If F-1 subsequently obtained personal jurisdiction over
H, it could re-establish the original amount of the obligation according to its law. Such a situation might continue indefinitely.
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would not be applicable in such a situation, 0 the confusion which would result
from each subsequent forum's ability to disregard prior determinations as to
modification and to vary the decree by the application of its own law seems to
be too high a price to pay for the advancement of domestic interests or for
expertise. 1
A choice of law based on the specific interests (or lack of interests) of the
states involved may have to give way to a general policy favoring state to state
uniformity of result. 2 Where neither state has an interest there is no reason why
this general policy should not determine the choice of law.P3 But where both
states have an interest, subordination of the forum's interest is difficult to justify. However, along with its specific policy of protecting one of the parties with
respect to the particular change in circumstances involved it may be assumed
that a state has a general policy favoring the speedy and effective recognition
and enforcement of H's obligation of support, not only within that state, but
within any state in which subsequent litigation may arise. Uniformity of result
is desirable for the furtherance of such a policy. Thus, it may be suggested that
even at the sacrifice of the specific domestic policy the general policy should
prevail.
Two choices of law may be suggested, in furtherance of such a policy. The
choice of F-i law would have the advantage of providing a fixed standard at the
time of the rendition of the original decree and would, therefore, promote the
greatest uniformity. But where neither party resides in F-1 such a choice might
result in the application of a policy totally unrelated to the interests involved in
the litigation. An alternative would be a determination that the law of the state
of the residence of one of the parties should control. The choice of which party's
residence would be largely immaterial as long as consistently followed within the
particular case. However, the choice of W's residence might have the advantage
of preventing a defaulting runaway husband from choosing a residence solely on
the basis of a favorable modification policy. Such a determination would have
the advantage of being connected with the interests involved in the litigation
even though uniformity would be somewhat sacrificed where the operative party
50Res judicata would apply only if the legally cognizable circumstances remained unchanged. But if the law of each forum is to determine what changes justify modification, a
change in forum and resulting change of law would necessitate a different judicial determination as to the relevant circumstances of the parties.
11See note 49 supra.
52See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 227,246 (1958), where Professor Currie criticizes the uniformity-of-result justification of the traditional approach to conflict-of-laws problems. As these criticisms seem directed
at the desire for uniformity of result if a particular case were to arise de novo in different jurisdictions, it is questionable whether this criticism applies to the desire for uniformity where
dealing with subsequent litigation in a particular case.
51See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws,
10 Stan. L. Rev. 205, 234 n.86 (1958).
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has changed residence. But since the forum's law will apply where both parties
reside there,54 a slight sacrifice in uniformity has already been admitted.
The Worthley plan states that F-1 law is to determine the grounds for modification, apparently based upon the idea that due process requires that H be
allowed to present defenses in F-2 which would have been available in F-1.1
This interpretation of due process is open to serious criticism.56 In the light of
the prior discussion it may be suggested that the law ,governing modification
should be that of W's residence in all cases. 5 7 Thus the interests of the state, or
states, in which the parties reside will in large measure be followed and a high
degree of uniformity will be achieved.
As to retrospective modification, the Worthley plan provides that, after the
issue of modification has been litigated and judgment entered for a liquidated
sum, the installments are no longer subject to modification and are entitled to
full faith and credit in all other states5 As to modification of installments accrued subsequent to the F-2 decree and of future installments, the issues determined in the F-2 proceeding will be res judicata59 as long as the circumstances of
the parties remain unchanged. Following the holding of the Light case, that
prospectively modifiable decrees are entitled to full faith and credit as to future
54 The situation in which both parties reside in F-2 may become a more frequently recurring
one in view of a present predilection to secure a foreign divorce under more "liberal" laws
where economically feasible. Thus, Nevada may increasingly figure in as F-1 where the only
contact the parties have had with the state was the divorce litigation. See, e.g., McCabe v.
McCabe, 210 Md. 308, 123 A.2d 447 (1956).
5 The Worthley case relied on Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946), for this proposition.
The Supreme Court held that an action on a New York judgment for accrued alimony was not
entitled to full faith and credit since H had not been notified of the New York proceeding, and,
thus, he was prevented from presenting defenses, including retrospective modification, which
under New York law might have been available to him. The Court proceeded to state that
upon remand W might bring an action to enforce the original decree, but H should be allowed
to present any defenses he might have. Though not stated, the implication seems to be that
these were to be defenses available under New York law. No mention of due process was made,
however, regarding the subsequent F-2 proceeding. Though a majority of the Court held that
due process required that H be given notice of the F,1 proceeding regarding the accrued alimony, it does not follow that due process required the use of F-1 law in the F-2 proceeding.
Thus, the California Court's determination is open to question.
51 See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1958).
57 In the typical situation H has left F-i, W remaining. Thus, the choice of the law of IV's
residence would usually result in the application of F-1 law-for very different reasons, however, than those suggested by the Worthley decision.
68This procedure is consistent with that followed in those states allowing retrospective
modification whereby W may petition for the accrued installments to be entered as a judgment
for a liquidated sum no longer susceptible to retrospective modification. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, 1944) §1170. For the relation of such judgments to the Sistare
rule see Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944). As to the requirement of adequate notice of subsequent proceedings resulting in such a judgment see, Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
59
Having established that the law governing the grounds for modification is to be that of
W's residence, res judicata is now applicable since only those changed circumstances cognizable
under the law of her residence will be sufficient to open the question of modification in subsequent proceedings. Compare note 51 supra.
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installments, recognition of the F-2 decree would be mandatory on all states,
including F-1. And if the Light case may be liberally interpreted so as to require
full faith and credit to retrospectively modifiable decrees,"0 recognition of installments accrued subsequent to the F-2 proceeding would also be mandatory
in subsequent litigation.
The Worthley plan, with appropriate changes regarding the determination of
the law governing the grounds for modification, offers a practical means of resolving the problems of foreign modification. Since these problems may well
have formed the underlying considerations which have resulted in the "finality"
requirement, the adoption of a practical plan for foreign modification would constitute a strong step towards mandatory recognition and enforcement of foreign
modifiable alimony decrees.
IV
The difficulties presently encountered in attempts at direct enforcement suggest that a two-state proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act" may provide a suitable alternative procedure. While the Act is
designed primarily for the initial imposition of support duties,62 it can also be
used to enforce support duties obtained outside the Act.3 Where the Act is used
to impose a support duty, F-1 (the initiating state) determines whether W's
petition sets forth facts upon which a duty of support may be predicated. It
then forwards the petition to F-2 (the responding state) which determines and
fixes the amount of the obligation. Where the Act is used to enforce an existing
decree, F-2 determines only the amount to be enforced. 4 Since the decree functions only as a determination of the existence of a support duty, it is immaterial
that it may be subject to modification in F-1.
F-2 is not bound by the F-1 decree but may increase or decrease the obligation according to its own law as opposed to modification in a direct preceeding.
In the latter, F-2 law would necessarily affect the extent of the obligation only
where both parties reside there, a situation in which a two-state proceeding is
unnecessary. The implication of the provision that F-2 law should determine the
60

See discussion at 139 supra.
U.L.A. 1 (1957); Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 68, §50. The Illinois Act differs in a number of
respects from the original Uniform Act. While the Uniform Act applies only to inter-state proceedings, the Illinois Act applies to intra-state proceedings also. The Uniform Act, or similar
legislation, has been enacted in every state.
12See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the 1950 Act, 9C U.L.A. 3 (1957).
6 " 'Duty of support' includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any
court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial [legal] separation, separate maintenance or otherwise." Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1957) §2(6), 9C U.L.A. 16 (1957).
61See Thompson v. Thompson, 93 So.2d 90 (Fla., 1957). For other applications of the Act
to the enforcement of alimony decrees, see, Gohdes v. Gohdes, 134 Cal.App.2d 819, 286 P.2d
539 (1955); Whittlesey v. Bellah, 130 Cal.App.2d 182, 278 P.2d 511 (1955); Smith v. Smith,
125 Cal.App.2d 154, 270 P.2d 613 (1954).
95Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1957) §27, 9C U.L.A. 27 (1957). For a
criticism of this provision see Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42 Calif.
L. Rev. 382 (1954).
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duty of support and of the provision that no order made by F-2 shall supersede
any previous order of support" is not only that H and W will have to relitigate
the question of the extent of the support duty in any subsequent forum, but
-also that the F-2 order will not constitute a modification of the decree in any
subsequent direct proceeding.67 Direct enforcement does not present these difficulties; but if it is limited to "final" decrees, a two-state proceeding under the
Uniform Act may be W's only remedy. The Act does have the advantages, however, of providing W with a reasonably inexpensive procedure for enforcing her
right and entitling her to the equitable enforcement procedures.
Because of the defects in the determination of support duties, a direct enforcement proceeding appears preferable. A two-state proceeding would probably be
used only where W was unable to afford the expense of direct enforcement of the
decree via the full-faith-and-credit approach of the Light decision. This should
be particularly true in a state, such as Illinois, which has adopted the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, so that W will not only be assured of
complete substantive recognition of the foreign decree but of the necessary
equitable enforcement procedures as well. Therefore, mandatory direct
recognition and enforcement of foreign modifiable alimony decrees as suggested in the Light decision's determination that such decrees are entitled to
full faith and credit, coupled with equitable enforcement and the amended plans
for foreign modification suggested in the Worthley case, offer a necessary and
effective step towards a practical solution of the problems of recognition, enforcement, and modification of foreign alimony decrees which have troubled the
courts since the Lynde and Sistare decisions.
66

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1957) §27, 9C U.L.A. 69 (1957).

67Despain v. Despain, 78 Idaho 185, 300 P.2d 500 (1956). An order entered in California

under the Uniform Act was held not to constitute a modification of the original decree. Such a
result follows from Section 27 of the Act. The effect of this provision is that H, who has fulfilled
his obligations according to the order entered in the enforcement proceeding, may subsequently,
in a direct proceeding, find he is still liable for accruals under the decree. Similarly, a support
order entered in the responding state has been held not to bar subsequent direct action on the
original decree. Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, 272 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Civ.App., 1954).
68 Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1957) §22, 9C U.L.A. 60 (1957).

FEATHERBEDDING AND THE FEDERAL ANTIRACKETEERING ACT
Featherbedding describes a great variety of union attempts to preserve the
jobs of its members by requiring that work be done by inefficient methods, by
requiring employers to have their employees perform services which are unwanted or by forcing employers to hire employees whom they do not want.' The
ISee Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management 166 (1941). Featherbedding is
usually a response to technological change. See generally Aaron, Governmental Restraints on
Featherbedding, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 680 (1953); Countryman, The Organizd Musicians, 16 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 56, 77-85 (1948).

